

Message Text

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ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 NEA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07

H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01

SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 IO-14 AID-20 DRC-01 /159 W

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R 010710Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 4255

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USDEL JEC PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 5680

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: MARR, VS, ID, IR

SUBJECT: ICCS: IRAN AND INDONESIA

REF: (A) STATE 088290; (B) TEHRAN 3124; (C) SAIGON 5625;

(D) JAKARTA 5252; (E) TEHRAN 3301

1. FROM EVERYTHING EMBOFFS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LEARN FROM MEMBERS INDODEL AND IRDEL IN SAIGON, THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE PROSPECT THAT EITHER IRAN OR INDONESIA WILL WITHDRAW FROM ICCS AS A RESULT OF PRESENT IMPASSE. (WE RECOGNIZE, HOWEVER, THAT DECISIONS WILL NOT BE MADE BY DELS HERE BUT IN CAPITALS. MOREOVER FAILURE TO RESOLVE FINANCIAL PROBLEM COULD VERY EASILY TIP THE BALANCE AGAINST A DECISION TO STAY.) CURRENTLY, WORK OF ICCS IN COMPLETING CAI LAY INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS ADDRESSING OTHER INVESTIGATIONS HAS BEEN HELD UP BECAUSE OF PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES QUESTION WITHIN TPJMC. POLISH AND HUNGARIAN DEFECTION CASE HAVE COMPLICATED RELATIONS OF HUNGDEL AND POLDEL WITH GVN COMPONENT OF TPJMC AS WELL AS GIVEN THEM SPECIAL CONCERNS INTERNALLY.

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3. WHAT SEEMS TO BE REQUIRED AT THIS POINT IS SEPARATE ASSESS-

MENTS FOR BOTH TEHRAN AND JAKARTA SINCE THEIR POSITIONS ARE CURRENTLY CLOSER THAN BEFORE WHILE STILL NOT BEING IDENTICAL.

4. IRANIAN ASSESSMENT: AMB SADRY, AS CHIEF IRODEL AND APRIL CHAIRMAN, RECOMMENDED THAT FONOFF CALL IN HUNG AND POL AMBS TO MAKE A DEMARCHE ABOUT THE LACK OF COOPERATION THEIR DELEGATIONS IN ICCS. SADRY EXPRESSED SOME SURPRISE TO OTHER ICCS COLLEAGUES ABOUT THE EXACT LANGUAGE OF THE NOTES HANDED OVER WHICH, HE SAID, WAS CONSIDERABLY STRONGER THAN DRAFT NOTE WHICH HE HAD APPROVED. TWO CONCRETE RESULTS WERE ACHIEVED BY DELIVERY OF THE NOTES:

- 1) SADRI LEARNED THAT POLAND INTENDED TO SEND FORMER POLDEL AMB WASILEWSKI TO TEHRAN FOR CONSULTATION ON ICCS PROBLEMS AND
- 2) NEW POLDEL AMB FIJALKOWSKI MADE A FAREWELL CALL ON SADRY IN WHICH HE REFERRED TO NOTE AND INDICATED HIS INTENTION TO WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH SADRY UPON HIS RETURN.

5. EMBASSY COMMENT ON IRAN'S ACTION: EMB BELIEVES THAT FORTHRIGHTNESS OF DIRECT APPROACH BY IRAN TO COMMUNIST AMBS IN TEHRAN CANNOT BUT HELP. EMB WAS NOT AWARE IN ADVANCE OF SADRY'S RECOMMENDATION, THOUGH WE WERE AWARE OF HIS INCREASING CONCERN ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE ICCS. PART OF HIS GROWNING SENSE OF DIS-ENCHANTMENT, WE CONCLUDE, DEVELOPED UPON HIS RETURN FROM LEAVE IN JANUARY WHEN HE WAS HOW INEFFECTIVELY HIS EFFORTS WHILE CHRMN IN DECEMBER TO GET THE ICCS MOVING INTO INVESTIGATIONS WERE BEING FRUSTRATED. SADRY, WE BELIEVE, ALSO FELT SOMEWHAT LET-DOWN IN THE PERIOD AFTER POLDEL AMB KULAGA DEPARTED; HE BELIEVED THAT HIS CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH KULAGA, SOMETIMES WITH THE EFFECT OF DISREGARDING HUNGDEL AND INDODEL OR SNUBBING THEM, OFFERED A POSSIBILITY OF MAKING THE ICCS MORE EFFECTIVE. HE FOUND IT NOT AT ALL EASY TO DEAL WITH ACTING POLDEL CHIEF PRZYGODSKI, WHO WAS UNDERSTANDABLY NERVOUS IN NOT WANTING TO MAKE ANY NEW AGREEMENTS IN THE INTERIM PERIOD BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF NEW AMB FIJALKOWSKI, AND WHO, PERHAPS ALSO UNDERSTANDABLY, BECAME HIGHLY UPSET ABOUT THE "DISAPPEARANCE" OF HOLUB. WITH FIJALKOWSKI, SADRY HAS NOW REACHED THE POINT WHERE HE BELIEVES A WORKING RELATIONSHIP MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED AND HE QUITE EVIDENTLY DOES NOT SEE OVERRIDING NECESSITY FOR RETURNING HIMSELF TO TEHRAN FOR CONSULTATIONS UNTIL THE COMPLETION OF HIS MONTH'S LEAVE IN FRANCE.

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6. INDONESIAN ASSESSMENT: GOI HAS CONTINUED APPRAISAL OF INDODEL EFFECTIVENESS IN ICCS OVER SEVERAL MONTHS. IN CONNECTION WITH ASEAN MTG IN JAKARTA, GOI DECIDED TO CALL AMB DHARSONO HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS AND FOR HIS ASSISTANCE IN PREPARING PAPER ON ICCS AND SOUTH VIETNAM WHICH GOI WOULD DELIVER AT MTG. DHARSONO MAY WELL HAVE INSTIGATED HIS RETURN TO JAKARTA BECAUSE OF HIS DISSATISFACTION OVER ICCS DEVELOPMENTS. WHILE EMB KNOWS LITTLE OF EXACT CONTENTS HIS CONSULTATIONS AND TALKS WE BELIEVE THAT, AMONG OTHER ITEMS, HE WILL CHRONICLE: LACK OF COOPERATION OF

COMMUNIST SIDE, BREACH OF AGREEMENTS REACHED BY "CONSULTATION" SUBSEQUENTLY IN PLENARIES (HUNGDEL), FRUSTRATION OF INVESTIGATIONS BY COMMUNIST SIDE, MISMANAGEMENT ICCS AFFAIRS BY GVN, FAILURE OF COMMUNIST SIDE LIVE UP TO ITS OBLIGATIONS FINANCIALLY, LACK OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN FOUR SIGNATORIES, IMPRECISENESS OF TERMS OF AGREEMENT. INDODEL ALSO FEELS SADRY HAS IN PAST HANDLED RELATIONS WITH INDODEL CLUMSILY AND AT TIMES RUDELY AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SOME NATIONAL SENSITIVITIES AND PRIDE HAVE BEEN RUFFLED. DHARSONO ALSO FEELS INDODEL ROLE IN ICCS HAS NOT BEEN ACCORDED AS MUCH RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT BY JAKARTA AS HE FEELS NECESSARY, AND INDODEL HAS AT TIMES FELT JAKARTA CRITICAL OF ITS PERFORMANCE AND OF INDODEL PRESS CONFERENCES ON ICCS PROBLEMS. PROBABLY AT SUGGESTION OF INDODEL, GOI FONOFF HAS CALLED IN POLISH AND HUNGARIAN AMBS IN JAKARTA TO HEAR DEMARCHE ON INDONESIAN VIEWS OF LACK OF COOPERATION IN ICCS AND LACK OF IMPARTIAL ATTITUDES OF POLDEL AND HUNGDEL IN CARRYING OUT ICCS OBLIGATIONS. AS FAR AS EMB INFORMED, DEMARCHE WAS ORAL AND NOT WRITTEN.

7. EMBASSY COMMENT ON INDONESIA'S ACTIONS: EMB DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT GOI IS MOVING RAPIDLY TOWARD DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM ICCS. AMB IDRIS HAS SAID THIS UNEQUIVOCALLY HERE, ADMITTING THAT FROM HIS PERSONAL STANDPOINT, WITHDRAWAL OF THE DELEGATION WOULD ALSO TERMINATE THAT FOR HIM IS A DIFFICULT ASSIGNMENT. FURTHER, ACCORDING REUTERS DESPATCH WITH JAKARTA DATELINE, MALIK ANNOUNCED IN JAKARTA THAT GOI WAS NOT PLANNING TO WITHDRAW FROM ICCS.

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R 010710Z MAY 74

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EMB DOES BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT INDODEL WISHES OBTAIN CERTAIN AMOUNT OF COMMENDATION FOR FIRMNESS ITS STAND IN ICCS AND RIGHTNESS ITS POSITION. ACTION OF INDONESIAN FONOFF IN CALLING IN HUNGARIAN AND POLISH AMBS, ALONG WITH DRV AMB, WAS CERTAINLY WARRANTED; IT MAY HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY USEFUL AT THIS TIME SINCE IT GAVE IMPRESSION OF CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN INDODEL AND IRDEL AND CERATION OF A UNITED FRONT VIS-A-VIS COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS. EMB DOES NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD AS YET EVEN APPEAR TO BE COUNSILING OR ADVISING THE INDONESIANS TO RETREAT FROM THE CONFRONTATION LINE THEY HAVE DRAWN, FOR ANY WAVERING ON THIER PART WILL ONLY CONVINCE COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS THAT INDONESIANS WILL ULTIMATELY COMPROMISE.

8. EMBASSY ASSESSMENT PRESENT STANCE OF COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS:
IN OUR VIEW, IT HAS BEEN USEFUL FOR HUNGDEL AND POLDEL TO HAVE TO FACE UP TO THE SOMEWHAT TENSE SITUATION THEIR POLICIES HAVE PRODUCED AND TO HAVE TO DEAL ON A BILATERAL BASIS WITH INDONESIAN AND IRANIAN VIEWS. EMB BEELS IT IS PERHAPS STILL TOO EARLY TO ASSUME HUNGDEL AND POLDEL WILL MAKE MAJOR CHANGES IN THEIR POSITIONS TO DATE, THOUGH THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE A GOOD CHANCE
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THAT SOME ADJUSTMENT IN THEIR POSITIONS MAY RESULT, ONCE WE ARE OVER THE SUSPICIONS ENGENDERED BY DEFECTIONS FROM EACH DELEGATION AND OVER THE CURRENT GVN-"PRG" IMPASSE IN THE TPJMC. EMB BELIEVES THAT HUNGDEL AND POLDEL CANNOT AFFORT FOR TOO LONG INTERNAL CRITICISM WITHIN THE ICCS ON THEIR LACK OF COOPERATION, HINTS OF THEIR LACK OF IMPARTIALITY, OR PUBLIC AND PRESS COMMENTS ON THEIR ACTIONS TO BLOCK INVESTIGATIONS AND FULL DEPLOYMENT OF THE ICCS. HUNGDEL AND POLDEL WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY PREFER TO HAVE THEIR ICCS ACTIONS AND POLICIES RETAIN BEHIND CURTAIN OF SECRECY AND "UNANIMITY".

9. IT IS DIFFICULT FROM SAIGON TO GET A CLEAR FIX ON JUST WHAT LIMITS MAY EXIST ON THE OPTIONS OF THE HUNGDEL AND POLDEL. SINCE MEMBERS OF BOTH DELEGATIONS HAVE AT TIMES OPENLY STATED THAT THE US SHOULD DISCUSS CERTAIN TOPICS IN MOSCOW RATHER THAN IN SAIGON, WARSAW OR BUDAPEST, THEY OBVIOUSLY SEE THEIR OWN POLICIES IN THE ICCS AS DEFINED AND LIMITED BY THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THIS MIGHT WELL BE TRUE, BUT IT MAY ALSO BE A CLEVER RATIONALE. WE CANNTO BELIEVE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOME OF THE INTRICATE TURNINGS OF COMMUNIST TACTICS IN THE INVESTIGATION QUESTION ARE BASED ON PERIODIC INSTRUCTIONS FROM MOSCOW. WHAT SEEMS TO US REASONABLE IS THAT THE DELEGATIONS ARE UNDER THE BROADEST KIND OF INSTRUCTION TO THE EFFECT THAT THEIR ROLE IN THE ICCS IS TO PROTECT AND ADVANCE THE INTEREST

OF THEIR COMMUNIST ALLIES, THE DRV AND THE "PRG". MOST, BUT NOT ALL ISSUES WITHIN THE ICCS CAN BE RELATED IN SOME WAY TO THE DRV AND THE "PRG", BUT THE RANGE OF COMPROMISE POSSIBLE IS PERHAPS NOT AS GREAT AS WE WOULD LIKE.

10. EMB CONCLUDES THAT CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFRONTATION WITHIN ICCS IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. WITH TWO COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS STRONGLY COMMITTED TO PROTECTION OF INTEREST OF "PRG" AND DRV, ABSENCE OF CONFRONTATION WOULD MEAN COMPROMISE ALWAYS IN FAVOR OF COMMUNIST POSITIONS, WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE IN BEST INTERESTS OF US OR GVN. WHILE INDODEL HAS HAD CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE WITH CONFRONTATION AND COMPROMISE IN THE ICCS, THEY HAVE NOW EVIDENTLY DRAWN THE LINE AND SEE THEMSELVES AS THE "NEW HARDLINERS, THE NEW CANADIANS." AMB SADRY AND IRDEL HAVE, TO CERTAIN EXTENT, BECOME FED UP WITH END RESULTS OF EFFORTS TO DATE, SOMETIMES INVOLVING COMPROMISE ON THEIR PARTS. THEMPERS OF BOTH IRDEL AND INDODEL HAVE BECOME SOMEWHAT FRAYED BOTH WITH
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EACH OTHER AND WITH COMMUNIST COLLEAGUES. ADDITIONALLY, BOTH IRDEL AND INDODEL ARE CRITICAL GVN POLICES IN TPJMC. NONE OF THIS ADDS UP TO IMMINENT INTENTIONS EITHER DELEGATION WITHDRAW FROM ICCS.

11. HOWEVER, FACT IS THAT DECISIONS WILL BE MADE IN JAKARTA AND TEHRAN ON BASIS OF CONSIDERATIONS OF WHICH INPUT FROM DELEGATIONS HERE IN ONLY ONE ELEMENT. MOREOVER FAILURE ON PART OF US TO RESOLVE INTERNAL PROBLEMS ON FUTURE ICCS FINANCING -- WHICH IS ICCS' MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM -- COULD WELL REVERSE OTHERWISE FAVORABLE DECISIONS IN BOTH CAPITALS.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TRUCE OBSERVERS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 01 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974SAIGON05680
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740104-0903
From: SAIGON
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740582/aaaacwcw.tel
Line Count: 257
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: (A) STATE 088290; (B) TEHRAN 3124; (, C) SAIGON 5625;
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 APR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <15 JAN 2003 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ICCS: IRAN AND INDONESIA
TAGS: MARR, VS, ID, IR, ICCS
To: JAKARTA TEHRAN
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005